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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240307T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240307T173000
DTSTAMP:20260817T205926
CREATED:20230602T090811Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230602T090811Z
UID:10000304-1709827200-1709832600@ceppa-test.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) - Renee Jorgensen (Michigan)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Encroachment and epistemic negligence \nAbstract: In this talk\, I argue that the moral duty of non-negligence is a fruitful way to understand and motivate the claim that moral reasons can ‘encroach’ on epistemic norms. More forcefully: we should readily affirm that on the epistemic norms governing agents like us—that is\, who have limited cognitive resources\, conduct inquiries with widely varying practical and moral stakes\, and who rely on belief to simplify and structure their practical deliberation—the strength of evidential warrant necessary to justify belief is responsive to the gravity of the costs of being mistaken. I suggest that a ‘purism’ about doxastic justification that denies this faces a dilemma: either a belief’s being justified suffices to license using it to structure inference and inquiry\, or it isn’t. If it is\, then being insensitive to non-truth-conducive factors leaves the standard for justified belief unresponsive to relevant risks. If it isn’t\, then it is unclear what theoretical value the notion justified belief has\, and we still need something to fill the role of licensing the relevant epistemic moves (which will be responsive to the risks.) \nLocation: Teams (online only)\, we will bee streaming it from Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa-test.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-renee-jorgensen-michigan/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Jessica Brown":MAILTO:jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231109T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231109T173000
DTSTAMP:20260817T205926
CREATED:20230602T090331Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230602T090331Z
UID:10000301-1699545600-1699551000@ceppa-test.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) - Lara Buchak (Princeton)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Risk\, Ambiguity\, and Ethical Decision-Making \nAbstract: I argue that it can be rational to defer to an authority about what to believe or what to do even when doing so goes against one’s own reasoning. Indeed\, such deference is rational in typical cases in which individuals treat others as authorities: for example\, experts in a domain\, interpersonal advisors\, and religious traditions. I explain the interplay between authority\, reason\, and disagreement\, and how rational faith gives rise to epistemic communities and governs their encounters with each other. \nLocation: Teams (online only) and streamed from Edgecliffe G03.
URL:https://ceppa-test.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-lara-buchak-princeton/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Jessica Brown":MAILTO:jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220609T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220609T173000
DTSTAMP:20260817T205926
CREATED:20220402T100027Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220402T100027Z
UID:10000150-1654790400-1654795800@ceppa-test.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Brian Hedden (ANU)
DESCRIPTION:Location: School 6 \nTitle: Counterfactual Decision Theory \nAbstract: I defend counterfactual decision theory\, which says that you should evaluate an act in terms of which outcomes would likely obtain\, were you to perform it. Counterfactual decision theory has traditionally been subsumed under causal decision theory as a particular formulation of the latter. This is a mistake. Counterfactual decision theory is importantly different from\, and superior to\, causal decision theory. Causation and counterfactuals come apart in three kinds of cases. In cases of overdetermination\, an act can cause a good outcome without the latter counterfactually depending on the former. In cases of constitution\, an act can constitute a good outcome rather than causing it. In cases of determinism\, either the laws or the past counterfactually depend on your act\, even though your act cannot cause the laws or the past to be different. In each of these cases\, it is counterfactual decision theory which gives the right verdict\, and for the right reasons. \nCo-Hosted with ECT
URL:https://ceppa-test.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-brian-hedden-anu/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Jessica Brown":MAILTO:jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220421T103000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220421T120000
DTSTAMP:20260817T205926
CREATED:20220225T155313Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220225T155313Z
UID:10000145-1650537000-1650542400@ceppa-test.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Stephanie Collins (Monash University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Legislative Intent: A Rational Unity Account\n(co-authored with David Tan (Deakin University)) \nAbstract: Does the legislature have intentions concerning the effects of legislation? If so\, how can that intent be known by outsiders? Existing theories of legislative intent can be divided into three camps: skepticism\, constructivism\, and realism. This paper begins by outlining problems for existing realist accounts. The paper then offers a new realist theory of legislative intent: the rational unity account. The paper explains how this account avoids the problems with existing versions of realism\, while also capturing the sense in which the legislature is a rational agent with intentions that can be distinguished from the intentions of individual legislators. We explain what evidence outsiders can\, and should\, use when attributing intentions to the legislature. \nCo-Hosted with ECT.
URL:https://ceppa-test.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-stephanie-collins-monash-university/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Jessica Brown":MAILTO:jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211111T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211111T173000
DTSTAMP:20260817T205926
CREATED:20210830T152450Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T152450Z
UID:10000093-1636646400-1636651800@ceppa-test.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: “Epistemic Reparations and the Right to be Known” \nAbstract: In this paper\, I provide an account of the epistemic significance of the phenomenon of “being known” and the relationship it has to reparations that are distinctively epistemic. Drawing on a framework provided by the United Nations of the “right to know\,” I argue that victims of gross violations and injustices not only have the right to know what happened\, but also the right to be known—to be a giver of knowledge to others about their own experiences. I show how such victims can suffer epistemic wrongs by being rendered invisible\, vilified or demonized\, or systematically distorted\, and that these ways of not being known demand epistemic reparations. While there are traditional reparations that are epistemic in nature\, such as memorialization and education\, I argue that there is a prior and arguably more important epistemic reparation—knowing victims of gross violations and injustices in the sense of bearing witness. I conclude by sketching an epistemological picture to underwrite this notion of epistemic reparations\, one that significantly expands the traditional picture by including epistemic duties that are imperfect in nature and concern actions in addition to beliefs.
URL:https://ceppa-test.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-jennifer-lackey-northwestern-university/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Jessica Brown":MAILTO:jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk
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